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Abstract. The security proofs for isogeny-based undeniable signature
schemes have been based primarily on the assumptions that the One-
Sided Modified SSCDH problem and the One-More SSCDH problem are
intractable. We challenge the validity of these assumptions, showing that
both the decisional and computational variants of these problems can be
solved in polynomial time. We further demonstrate an attack, applica-
ble to two undeniable signature schemes, one of which was proposed at
PQCrypto 2014. The attack allows to forge signatures in 24λ/5 steps on
a classical computer. This is an improvement over the expected classical
security of 2λ, where λ denotes the chosen security parameter.
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1 Introduction
Most currently deployed cryptographic schemes are based on mathematical prob-
lems that are assumed to be hard on classical computers, but can be solved in
polynomial time using quantum algorithms. Continuous progress in quantum
computing therefore requires the development of “post-quantum secure” cryp-
tography relying on problems that will (at least to the best of our knowledge)
remain hard for quantum algorithms. To achieve quantum resistance some di-
rections currently being explored include lattice-based, multivariate, code-based,
and hash-based cryptography and, most recently, cryptography based on isogeny
problems. While the latter is appealing for relatively small key sizes compared
to other candidates, it requires further optimization and scrutiny.
Isogeny-based cryptography was first proposed by Couveignes in 1997 in a
seminar at the ENS [7], but he did not publish his ideas at the time. Almost a
decade later Rostovtsev and Stolbunov rediscovered and further developed the
same idea independently [20]. While these cryptosystems were based on “ordi-
nary curves”, “supersingular curves” were first put to use in the construction of a
hash function by Charles, Goren and Lauter [4]. Jao and De Feo introduced an-
other cryptosystem in the supersingular case, the so called Supersingular Isogeny
Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) [11]. Instead of using the action of the class group on cer-
tain isomorphism classes of ordinary elliptic curves like Couveignes, Rostovtsev
2 Simon-Philipp Merz, Romy Minko and Christophe Petit
and Stolbunov, SIDH relies on the simple observation that it does not matter in
which order we divide out two non-intersecting subgroups of an elliptic curve.
One promising submissions to NIST’s post-quantum standardization project [18]
is the SIDH-based key exchange protocol called SIKE [1].
For a nice introduction to different computational problems in supersingu-
lar isogeny-based cryptography we refer to Galbraith and Vercauteren [10]. The
template for isogeny-based cryptography is the general isogeny problem. That
is, to find an isogeny φ : E1 → E2, for two randomly chosen isogenous curves
E1 and E2. A variant of this problem includes the additional information of the
degree of φ. This reduces the problem space from an infinite to a finite number
of isogenies while simultaneously reducing the search space. Hence, it is not clear
whether it makes the problem harder or easier. Another related problem is the
computation of endomorphism rings of supersingular elliptic curves. Assume you
know the endomorphism ring of a supersingular curve E1 and you want to com-
pute the endomorphism ring of E2. This is computationally broadly equivalent
to computing an isogeny φ : E1 → E2 [15, 16].
However, more practical supersingular isogeny constructions give more in-
formation to a potential attacker. For example, the SIDH protocol, which we
will describe in Section 3 in more detail, reveals the image of certain torsion
points under some secret isogenies in addition to the origin and image curves. It
was observed that this additional information might make the problem a priori
easier and a framework for a potential attack under additional assumptions was
given by Petit [19].
Various other versions of isogeny problems have been suggested and conjec-
tured to be hard by other authors to provide security proofs for their crypto-
graphic constructions.
Our contribution: In this work, we will review some of the isogeny prob-
lems that have been suggested in the construction of isogeny-based undeniable
signatures [12] published at PQCrypto 2014. While this construction has been
used and extended by other authors [22], we show that the assumptions used to
make the security proofs work are not valid and the proposed isogeny problems
lack the conjectured hardness. This does not immediately lead to an attack on
the signature scheme itself. However, we propose an attack on the cryptographic
construction as well.
Outline: In Section 2 we recall some mathematical background on isogeny-
based cryptography. In Section 3 we give the definitions of some isogeny problems
that have been used in the literature and we give an attack on two of them. The
following Section 4 describes how the problems have been used in the construc-
tion of isogeny-based undeniable signatures of [12]. We provide an attack on
the signature scheme combining a near-collision search in the hash function and
the attack on the underlying isogeny problem. Before concluding the paper, we
mention other constructions that are affected by our attacks in Section 5.
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2 Mathematical background
For a full treatment of background information on elliptic curves and a detailed
introduction to isogeny-based cryptography we refer to Silverman [21] and De
Feo [9], respectively.
Let Fq be a finite field of characteristic p. In the following we assume p ≥ 3
and therefore an elliptic curve E over Fq can be defined by its short Weierstrass
form
E(Fq) = {(x, y) ∈ F2q | y2 = x3 +Ax+B} ∪ {OE}
where A,B ∈ Fq and OE is the point (X : Y : Z) = (0 : 1 : 0) on the projective
curve Y 2Z = X3 + AXZ2 + BZ3. The set of points on an elliptic curve is an
abelian group under the “chord and tangent rule” with OE being the identity
element. The number of points on an elliptic curve is #E(Fq) = q+1−t for some
integer t ≤ 2√q. A curve E is called supersingular if p|t and ordinary otherwise.




and there is an isomorphism f : E → E′ if and only if j(E) = j(E′).
Given two elliptic curves E1 and E2 over a finite field Fq, an isogeny is a
morphism φ : E1 → E2 such that φ(OE1) = OE2 . One can show that isogenies
are morphisms both in the sense of algebraic geometry and group theory. If there
exists a non-constant isogeny between them, two curves are called isogenous. The
degree of an isogeny φ is its degree when treated as an algebraic map. This is
equal to the size of the kernel of φ if the isogeny is separable (which is always
the case in this work).
Since an isogeny defines a group homomorphism E1 → E2, its kernel is a
subgroup of E1. Conversely, any subgroup S ⊂ E1 determines a (separable)
isogeny φ : E1 → E2 with ker(φ) = S and E2 = E1/S. Since all isogenies in
the following will have cyclic groups as kernels, knowledge of the isogeny and
knowledge of the kernel of the isogeny are equivalent.
A basic example of an isogeny is the multiplication by n map on an elliptic
curve [n] : E → E. The kernel of the multiplication by n map over the algebraic
closure Fq of Fq is the n-torsion subgroup
E[n] = {P ∈ E(Fq) : [n]P = OE}.
Whenever n and q are relatively prime, the group E[n] is isomorphic to (Z/nZ)2.
Given any isogeny φ : E1 → E2, there exists another isogeny φˆ, called the
dual isogeny, satisfying φ ◦ φˆ = φˆ ◦ φ = [deg(φ)].
3 The one-more isogeny problem
We begin this section by recalling the SIDH protocol and a problem underlying
its security. Then, we define and illustrate the somewhat more artificial isogeny
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problems that were conjectured to be hard and that are used in the security
proofs of [12, 22]. However, at the end of this section we present our polynomial
time attack against these more artificial problems and show that no confidence
in them is justified.
3.1 Problem statements
Even though we do not attack SIDH, it is useful to recall this fundamental key
exchange protocol as it contains some ideas upon which the undeniable signature
schemes we cryptanalyze are based.
Let p be a prime of the form `eAA `
eB
B ·f±1 where `A and `B are small distinct
primes, eA and eB are positive integers and f is some (usually small) cofactor.
Moreover, we fix a supersingular elliptic curve E defined over Fp2 together with
bases {PA, QA}, {PB , QB} of the `eAA and `eBB torsion of E, E[`eAA ] and E[`eBB ],
respectively.
Suppose Alice and Bob wish to establish a shared secret. Alice’s secret is
an integer a ∈ {0, . . . , `eAA − 1}, defining the subgroup A := 〈PA + [a]QA〉
of E[`eAA ]. Her public key is the curve EA := E/A together with the images
φA(PB), φA(QB) of Bob’s public basis under her secret isogeny φA : E →
E/A. Analogously, Bob chooses his secret key b ∈ {0, . . . , `eBB − 1} defining the
cyclic subgroup B := 〈PB + [b]QB〉 ⊂ E[`eBB ], and his public key is the tuple
(EB , φB(PA), φB(QA)).
The key exchange proceeds as follows: Upon receipt of Bob’s public key, Alice
uses the points to push her secret A ⊂ E[`eAA ] to E/B, i.e. Alice computes an
isogeny φ′A : EB → EAB with kernel 〈φB(PA) + [a]φB(QA)〉 ⊂ E/B[`eAA ]. Bob





B(φA(E)) = E/〈PA + [a]QA, PB + [b]QB〉,
where the equality holds up to isomorphism. Since the j-invariant is the same







Fig. 1. The commutative diagram of the SIDH key exchange
The hardness of the following problem underlies the security of the SIDH pro-
tocol.
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Definition 1 (Supersingular Computational Diffie-Hellman (SSCDH)
Problem). Let mA, nA be chosen at random from {0, . . . , `eAA − 1} not both
divisible by `A. Analogously, let mB , nB be randomly chosen from {0, . . . , `eBB −1}
not both divisible by `B. Furthermore, let φA : E → EA and φB : E → EB denote
the isogenies with kernel 〈[mA]PA+[nA]QA〉 and 〈[mB ]PB+[nB ]QB〉 respectively.
Given the curves EA, EB and the points φA(PB), φA(QB), φB(PA) and
φB(QA), find the j-invariant of
EAB = E/〈[mA]PA + [nA]QA, [mB ]PB + [nB ]QB〉.
For the following, we fix the notation of Definition 1.
Definition 2 (Modified SSCDH (MSSCDH) Problem). [12] Given EA,
EB and ker(φB), determine EAB up to isomorphism, i.e. j(EAB).
Note that knowledge of ker(φB) is equivalent to knowledge of φB , but the
lack of information on the auxiliary points in the image of φA in the MSSCDH
problem prevents to shift ker(φB) into EA.
Definition 3 (One-sided Modified SSCDH (OMSSCDH) Problem). [12]
For fixed EA, EB, given an oracle to solve MSSCDH for any EA, EB′ , ker(φB′)













Fig. 2. The oracle provides EAB′ for any E′B and φB′ , while EAB needs to be found
in OMSSCDH
While the OMSSCDH assumption seems somewhat more artificial, it arises natu-
rally in the security analysis of undeniable signatures proposed in [12]. Moreover,
the authors proposing the problem conjectured it to be computationally infeasi-
ble, in the sense that for any polynomial-time solver algorithm, the advantage of
the algorithm is a negligible function in the security parameter log p. However,
we will see in the next subsection that a polynomial time attacker will have a
non-negligible advantage to solve the OMSSCDH problem.
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A decisional variant of this problem is also defined in [12]; our attack will
apply to it in the obvious way as well.
Our results furthermore break other strongly related problems, such as the
following slightly weaker problem used in the construction of undeniable blind
signatures [22].
Definition 4 (One-More SSCDH (1MSSCDH) Problem). Let E be some
base curve of the form as in the SIDH protocol and let mA, nA be secret integers
in {0, . . . , `eAA − 1}.
Let a signing oracle respond EAB ∼= EB/〈[mA]PB + [nA]QB〉 upon receipt of a
curve EB isogenous to E and points PB, QB spanning EB [`eBB ].
The 1MSSCDH problem is to produce at least q + 1 distinct pairs of curves
(EBi , EABi), where EBi are `
eB
B -isogenous to E, PBi and QBi span EBi [`
eB
B ]
and EABi is isomorphic to EBi/〈[mA]PBi + [nA]QBi〉 for 1 ≤ i ≤ q + 1, after q
queries to the signing oracle.
Compared to the OMSSCDH problem it leaves the choice of the additional
MSSCDH instance which needs to be solved to the attacker. Both problems are
somewhat natural variants of the SSCDH problem underlying the security of
SIDH. However, variants of computational problems used in cryptography are
not always as hard as the original problems themselves [13, 14].
3.2 Basic attack
Now, we describe our attacks on the OMSSCDH and 1MSSCDH problems.
Theorem 1. A solution to the OMSSCDH problem (Definition 3) can be guessed
with probability 1(`B+1)`B after a single query to the signing oracle.
Proof. Assume an attacker wants to solve OMSSCDH given EA, EB and ker(φB).
Let EB′ be another curve `2B-isogenous to EB and `
eB
B -isogenous to E. That is,
one gets from EB to EB′ via backtracking the last `B-isogeny step of φB . Note,
one could guess such an EB′ with probability `B−1(`B+1)`B even without knowing
φB .
Then, the attacker can query the oracle on EB′ to receive EAB′ . Now, any
curve in the isomorphism class of EAB is `2B-isogenous to EAB′ as depicted in
Figure 3. Therefore an attacker can guess the isomorphism class of EAB correctly
with probability ((`B + 1)`B)−1 finishing the proof.
In practice the prime `B is chosen to be small (usually 2 or 3) and thus Theorem 1
breaks the OMSSCDH problem completely.
Remark 1. Without the condition on the degree of the isogeny between the
curves submitted to the OMSSCDH oracle and the base curve, the attack can
be made even more efficient. Namely, an attacker can always solve this modified
version of the OMSSCDH problem after two queries to the oracle as follows.
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E ◦ ◦ EB
EB′
EA ◦ ◦ EAB
EAB′
Fig. 3. Query of OMSSCDH oracle on `2B-isogenous curve via backtracking one step
yields elliptic curve close to target curve
The attacker computes two curves EB1 , EB2 of different isomorphism classes
that are `B-isogenous to EB . Knowing ker(φB) the attacker can compute ker(φBi)
and they can query the oracle to solve MSSCDH for EA, EBi and ker(φBi) for
i = 1, 2. The oracle sends back EABi which are `B-isogenous to the unknown
EAB as shown in Figure 4. Listing all `B + 1 isomorphism classes which are
`B-isogenous to EAB1 and EAB2 respectively, we find the isomorphism class of
EAB as it is the only one appearing in both lists.
E ◦ ◦ EB ◦
EA ◦ ◦ EAB ◦
Fig. 4. Diagonal maps are the signing oracle sending `B-isogenous curves of EB to
`B-isogenous curves of target curve EAB
Clearly, the attack described in Theorem 1 can be generalised to OMSSDDH,
the decisional variant of OMSSCDH. Furthermore, a solution to the OMSSCDH
problem implies a solution to the 1MSSCDH problem which yields the following
theorem.
Theorem 2. A solution to the 1MSSCDH problem (Definition 4) can be guessed
with probability 1(`B+1)`B after a single query to the signing oracle.
4 Application to Jao-Soukharev’s construction
We now describe the application of our attack against Jao-Soukharev’s undeni-
able signature scheme [12]. For background knowledge on undeniable signature
schemes we refer the reader to [5, 8, 17].
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4.1 Jao-Soukharev undeniable signatures
An undeniable signature scheme is a scheme in which signatures can only be ver-
ified with cooperation from the signer [5]. Upon receipt of a signature σ from a
verifier, the signer engages in a zero-knowledge confirmation (or disavowal) pro-
tocol to prove the validity (or invalidity) of σ. The security properties required
by an undeniable signature scheme are undeniability, unforgeability and invis-
ibility. Undeniability ensures that a signer cannot repudiate a valid signature.
Unforgeability is the notion that an adversary cannot compute a valid message-
signature pair without knowledge of the signer’s secret key. Invisibility requires
that an adversary cannot distinguish between a valid signature and a signature
produced by a simulator with non-negligible probability. We refer to Appendix A
for a full definition of all security games for undeniable signature schemes.




C · f ± 1.
We fix a supersingular curve E over Fp2 and bases {PA, QA}, {PB , QB} and
{PC , QC} of the `eAA , `eBB and `eCC torsion of E, E[`eAA ], E[`eBB ] and E[`eCC ], re-
spectively. The public parameters of the scheme are p, E and the three tor-
sion bases, together with a hash function H. The signer generates random in-
tegers mA, nA ∈ Z/`eAA and computes the isogeny φA : E → EA, defined as in
Problem 3.1. The public key consists of the curve EA together with the points
{φA(PC), φA(QC)} and the integersmA, nA constitute the private key. Note that
this is equivalent to taking φA as the private key.
To sign a message M, the signer computes the hash h = H(M) of the message
and the isogenies
φB : E → EB = E/〈PB + [h]QB〉
φAB : EA → EAB = EA/〈φA(PB + [h]QB)〉
φBA : EB → EAB = EB/〈φB([mA]PA + [nA]QA)〉.
The signer then outputs EAB in addition to the set of two auxiliary points
{φBA(φB(PC)), φBA(φB(QC))} as the signature.
Given a signature σ = (E,P,Q), the first step in the confirmation and dis-
avowal protocols is for the signer to select mC , nC ∈ Z/`eCC Z and compute the
curves EC = E/〈[mC ]PC + [nC ]QC〉, EBC = EB/〈φB([mC ]PC + [nC ]QC)〉,
EAC = EA/〈φA([mC ]PC+[nC ]QC)〉 and EABC = EBC/〈φB([mA]PA+[nA]QA)〉.
The signer outputs these curves and ker(φCB) as the commitment, where φCB is
the isogeny from EC to EBC . In addition to the auxiliary points of the signature,
this commitment gives the verifier enough information to compute EABC and
EσC = Eσ/〈[mC ]P + [nC ]Q〉, to check whether EσC = EABC . Further details of
the confirmation and disavowal protocols can be found in [12].
In the Jao-Soukharev construction, the adversary knows EA and can compute
EBi and ker(φBi), corresponding to messageMi, fromH. The signing oracle then
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essentially solves MSSCDH for any of the adversary’s input messages Mi. The
paper claims that under the assumption that the confirmation and disavowal
protocols of the signature scheme are zero-knowledge, the unforgeability game
describes the OMSSCDH problem. We will show that this claim is incorrect.
4.2 Another look at the security proof of [12]
In [12] the claim is made that forging a signature for this construction is equiv-
alent to solving OMSSCDH, so one would expect our attack to directly break
unforgeability. However, equivalence would only be true if an attacker had the
freedom to submit arbitrary curves to the signing oracle. In the protocol, an ad-
versary wishing to forge a signature can only query the signing oracle with mes-
sages, Mi. In the Jao-Soukharev signing protocol the curves EBi are computed
from message hashes, rather than the messages themselves. Thus, an adversary
would need to find a message mapping to some specific curve first for the scheme
to be equivalent to OMSSCDH and thus an adversary would need to break the
hash function. Forging messages seems therefore actually harder than breaking
OMSSCDH.
As a consequence the attack of Section 3 applies to the hardness assumption
but not the actual protocol in [12]. However, in this section we will demonstrate
how a hybrid version of our attack on OMSSCDH and finding “near-collisions”
in the hash function allows to reduce the security of the construction for the
given parameters.
In accounting for the scheme’s loss of malleability due to the hash function
we make use of the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. Let E be a supersingular elliptic curve, let ` be a prime, let e be an
integer, and let {P,Q} be a basis for E[`e]. Let n,m < `e be positive integers
congruent modulo `k for some integer k < e. Then the `-isogeny paths from E
to EA = E/〈P + [n]Q〉 and EB = E/〈P + [m]Q〉 are equal up to the k-th step.
Proof. Let m = n+α`k, for some α > 0. Let φA : E → EA be a separable, cyclic
isogeny of deg(φA) = `e and ker(φA) = 〈P + [n]Q〉. We can express φA as the
composition of e `-isogenies such that φA = φA1 ◦ . . . φAe . Likewise, φB : E → EB
can be expressed as φB = φB1 ◦ . . . φBe . The single `-isogenies correspond to the
single steps in the `-isogeny graph. We will show that φAi = φBi for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
For i = 1, . . . , e, let φAi : Ei−1 → Ei be an isogeny with kernel 〈`e−iSAi−1〉,
where E0 = E, SA0 = P + [n]Q and SAi−1 = φAi−1(SAi−2). Define the φBi similarly,
with B substituted for A and m for n. A proof can be found in [6] that these are
`-isogenies and that φA1 ◦· · ·◦φAe = φA up to composition with an automorphism






i−1 ◦ · · · ◦ φA1 (`e−iSA0 )
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= `e−i(P + [n]Q) + `e−i+k[α]Q
= `e−i(P + [n]Q)
= `e−iSA0
using that isogenies are group homomorphisms and Q ∈ E[`e]. It follows that
φAi = φ
B
i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
LetM be the message upon which the adversary wishes to forge a signature. Let
H : {0, 1}∗ → Z be the public hash function used in the signature scheme. The
hash function determines a coefficient of a point in the E[`eii ] torsion group and
can therefore be treated as a function to a group of size 22λ for classical security





ψB′ , deg(ψB′) = `kB
ψB , deg(ψB) = `kB
φeB′
φeB
Fig. 5. Isogeny paths between EA, EAB and EAB′ . In our attack we use ψ = ψB ◦ ψˆB′
and have φAB′ = φeB′ ◦ φeB′−1 ◦ · · · ◦ φ1.
The attack proceeds as follows:
1. Build a near-collision on H with respect to the `B-adic metric. More pre-
cisely, find two messages M and M ′ such that the difference between H(M)
and H(M ′) is divisible by a large power of `B , say a power of size roughly
2L1 .
2. Submit M ′ to the signing oracle to obtain the signature
σ′ =
(
EAB′ , P1 := φB′A(φB′(PC)), P2 := φB′A(φB′(QC))
)
.
3. Guess the `2kB -isogeny ψ : EAB′ → EAB , where EAB is the unknown curve
corresponding to M . Let ψ = ψB ◦ ψˆB′ , the composition of two degree `kB ≈
2L2 isogenies with L2 = L−L1, where ψˆB′ corresponds to k backwards steps
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on the isogeny path from EAB′ and ψB corresponds to k forward steps to
EAB . This is illustrated in Figure 5. The probability of correctly identifying





4. Find s such that s`kB ≡ 1 mod `eCC . Compute the auxilary points of the
signature as {[s] · ψ(P1), [s] · ψ(P2)}.
5. Output σ = (EAB , [s] · ψ(P1), [s] · ψ(P2)).
Theorem 3. Let s, ψ, P1 and P2 be defined as in our attack. Moreover, let σ be
the signature (EAB , [s] ·ψ(P1), [s] ·ψ(P2)) computed in the attack. Assuming that
EAB is guessed correctly, σ is a valid signature.
Proof. Since ψ takes points on EAB′ to points on EAB , we have that ψ(P1), ψ(P2)
both lie on the target curve. Moreover, as ψ(P1) = ψ(φB′A(φB′(PC))), the point
lies in the `eCC torsion of EAB , EAB [`
eC
C ]. The same holds for ψ(P2). Although
these points would already pass the validation for the signature scheme, they can
be easily distinguished from the honestly generated points. The factor [s] in our
signature ensures that forged and honest signatures are identically distributed
as described in the following.
Recall that ψ = ψB ◦ ψˆB′ and P1 = φB′A(φB′(PC)). Since the order of PC is
coprime to deg(φB′A) and deg(φB′), and the isogeny diagram is commutative,
we can write P1 = φAB′(φA(PC)).
By expanding φAB′ we obtain
ψˆB′ ◦ φAB′ = φˆeB′−k ◦ · · · ◦ φˆeB′ ◦ φeB′ ◦ · · · ◦ φeB′−k ◦ . . . φeB−k ◦ · · · ◦ φ1
= [`kB ] ◦ φeB′−k−1 ◦ · · · ◦ φ1.
Since s is the multiplicative inverse of `kB modulo `
eC
C , we have
[s] · ψ(P1) = φAB(φA(PC)) ∈ EAB [`eCC ].
Analogously, we have [s] · ψ(P2) = φAB(φA(QC)) ∈ EAB [`eCC ].
Let P = φBA(φB(PC)) ∈ EAB [`eCC ] and Q = φBA(φB(QC)) ∈ EAB [`eCC ].
These are the points we expect in an honest signature. In both the confirma-
tion and disavowal protocols of the Jao-Soukharev scheme, the verifier uses the
auxiliary points to compute an isogeny from EAB to a curve Eσ defined as
EAB/〈[mC · s]ψ(P1) + [nC · s]ψ(P2)〉, where mC , nC ∈ Z/`eCC Z are integers cho-
sen by the signer. This curve is checked against EABC = EAB/〈[mC ]P + [nC ]Q〉
to determine the validity of σ. The two points obtained in our attack span the
subgroup EAB [`eCC ], and we have EAB as the correct signature curve, so it fol-
lows that Eσ = EABC up to isomorphism and thus the signature is accepted as
valid.
Finding a near-collision of L1 bits on H classically has cost 2L1/2. In Step 3 we
can then guess the correct isogeny and curve EAB with probability approximately
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2−2L2 = 2−2(L−L1). Taking L1 = 4L/5 the attack then has a total classical cost
of 22L/5, as opposed to the expected 2L/2.
Assuming that we can find (near)-collisions of the hash function with lower
quantum complexity [3], the first step of our attack costs 2L1/3 on a quantum
computer. Taking L1 = 6L/7, this could lower the complexity on a quantum
computer to 22L/7, as opposed to the expected 2L/3. However, it has been ar-
gued that quantum collision search might be inferior to classical collision search
because of the expensive memory access and quantum memory. For a general dis-
cussion on the impracticality of known quantum algorithms for collision search
we refer to Bernstein [2].
Clearly, our attack breaks the unforgeability property of the scheme. More-
over, we are also able to break invisibility, since any adversary with the ability to
forge signatures with higher probability can simply check whether the challenge
signature obtained in the invisibility game (see Appendix A) matches a potential
forgery.
5 Srinath and Chandrasekaran undeniable blind
signatures
Srinath and Chandrasekaran [22] extend the Jao-Soukharev construction to an
undeniable blind signature scheme, introducing a third actor, the requestor,
to the scheme. It is a four-prime variant of the original scheme, taking the






D · f ± 1 and adding the public pa-
rameter {PD, QD}, a basis for E[`eDD ]. The requestor computes the message
curve EB = E/〈PB + [H(m)]QB〉 using the public hash function, as before.
They then blind the curve by taking a random integer 0 < d < `eDD to com-
pute EBD = EB/〈φB(PD) + [d]φB(QD)〉. The blinded curve is then sent to the
signer. The Sign algorithm of the scheme functions in the same way as for the
Jao-Soukharev construction. Upon receipt of the blinded signature curve EBDA,
the requestor uses an unblinding algorithm to obtain the unblinded signature
EBA. The resulting signature is the same as the Jao-Soukharev signature. Thus,
signatures as in Srinath and Chandrasekaran are just Jao-Soukharev signatures
shifted through another coprime isogeny graph and the scheme is vulnerable to
our attack. As before, both unforgeability and invisibility can be broken.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the hardness of some isogeny problems used in cryp-
tography. In particular, we show that the OMSSCDH and 1MSSCDH problems
can be solved with non-negligible probability by a polynomial time attacker.
This contribution is particularly relevant to isogeny-based undeniable signature
schemes, as the security proofs for unforgeability and invisibility of currently
known schemes assume the hardness of these problems. We give basic attacks
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against both OMSSCDH and 1MSSCDH, which are also applicable to their de-
cisional variants.
Jao and Soukharev [12] proposed the first quantum-resistant undeniable
isogeny-based signature scheme, which was extended to include blindness by
Srinath and Chandrasekaran [22]. We present an attack against the unforgeabil-
ity and invisibility properties of the Jao-Soukharev protocol, showing that an
adversary with access to a signing oracle is able to forge arbitrary signatures
at lower cost than expected for a given security parameter, λ. To summarise,
this is achieved by computing a near-collision on the public hash function H
and guessing an `2kB -isogeny between an honest signature produced by the oracle
for one message to the target forgery curve. The classical cost for this attack is
24λ/5, with the hash function length equal to 2λ. We postulate that the quan-
tum cost for this attack is 26λ/7. These attacks imply that parameters should
now be increased by 25% to achieve the same classical security level (17% for
quantum security). Furthermore, we argue that the equivalence drawn in [12]
between unforgeability and the OMSSCDH problem is incorrect, and hence that
the security proofs in this paper are incorrect. We note that the inclusion of a
hash function increases the difficulty of forgery, assuming the hash function is
‘cryptographically secure’, as the adversary is forced to search for a message that
will result in a specific curve, rather than querying the oracle indiscriminately.
Finally, we review the Srinath-Chandrasekan signature scheme and show that
our attack is applicable against it. We also note the same problem with the se-
curity proofs.
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A Undeniable (Blind) Signature Schemes
Undeniable signature schemes were introduced by Chaum and van Antwerpen
[5], differing from traditional signature schemes in that verification of a signature
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cannot be completed without cooperation from the signer. Following the notation
of [17] we denote an undeniable signature scheme Σ by
Σ = {KeyGen, Sign, Check, Sim, picon, pidis}.
KeyGen is the PPT (probabalistic polynomial time) key generation algorithm,
which outputs (vk, sk) - a verification and signing key, respectively. Sign is
the PPT signing algorithm, taking a message m and sk as input to generate
a signature σ. Check is a deterministic validity checking algorithm, such that
Check((vk,m,σ),sk) returns 1 if (m,σ) is a valid message-pair and 0 if not. Sim
is a PPT algorithm outputting a simulated signature σ′ on input of vk and m.
Finally, picon and pidis are confirmation and disavowal protocols, respectively,
with which the signer can prove the validity (or invalidity) of a signature to the
verifier. These are zero-knowledge interactive protocols.
An undeniable signature scheme must satisfy undeniability, unforgeability
and invisibility. We use the definitions as stated in [8, 5, 17]. An undeniable blind
signature scheme must also satisfy blindness, as defined in [22].
Undeniability requires that a signer cannot use the disavowal protocol to
deny a valid signature. A signer is also unable to convince the verifier that an
invalid signature is valid.
Unforgeability is the notion that an adversary cannot compute a valid
message-signature pair with non-negligible probability. It is defined using the
following security game:
1. The challenger generates a key pair, giving the verification key to the adver-
sary.
2. The adversary is given access to a signing oracle and makes queries adap-
tively with messages mi, for i = 1, 2, . . . , k, for some k, receiving correspond-
ing signatures σi.
(a) The adversary additionally has access to a confirmation/disavowal oracle
for the protocol, which they can query adaptively with message-signature
pairs throughout step 2.
3. The adversary outputs a pair (m,σ).
The adversary wins the game (i.e. successfully forges a signature) if (m,σ)
is a valid message-signature pair and m 6= mi for any i = 1, 2, . . . k. A signature
scheme is unforgeable if any PPT adversary wins with only negligible probability.
Invisibility requires that an adversary cannot distinguish between a valid
signature and a simulated signature with non-negligible probability. It is defined
by the following security game:
1. The challenger generates a a key pair, giving the verification key to the
adversary.
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2. The adversary is given access to a signing oracle and makes queries adap-
tively with messages mi, for i = 1, 2, . . . , k, for some k, receiving correspond-
ing signatures σi.
(a) The adversary additionally has access to a confirmation/disavowal oracle
for the protocol, which they can query adaptively with message-signature
pairs throughout step 2.
3. The adversary sends a new message mj to the challenger.
4. The challenger computes a random bit b. If b = 1, the challenger computes
σ = Sign(mj , sk). If b = 0 the challenger computes σ = Sim(mj , vk). The
challenger sends σ to the adversary.
5. The adversary is able to query the signing oracle again, with access to the
confirmation/disavowal oracles. They cannot submit (mj , σ) to either oracle.
6. The adversary outputs a bit b∗.
The adversary wins the game if b∗ = b. An undeniable signature scheme is
invisible if |Pr(b = b∗)−1/2 | is negligible.
Blindness requires that an adversary cannot relate message-signature pairs
with their associated blind versions with non-negligible probability. It is defined
by the following security game:
1. The adversary generates a key pair (sk, vk).
2. The adversary chooses two messages, m0 and m1, and sends them to the
challenger.
3. The challenger computes a random bit b and reorders the messages as (mb,mb−1).
4. The challenger blinds the messages and sends them to the adversary.
5. The adversary signs the blinded messages, generating the signatures σblindb
and σblindb−1 , which are returned to the challenger.
6. The challenger applies an unblinding algorithm to σblindb and σ
blind
b−1 and
reveals the unblinded signatures, σb and σb−1, to the adversary.
7. The adversary outputs a bit b′.
The adversary wins if b′ = b. A signatures scheme is blind if |Pr(b = b∗)−1/2 |
is negligible.
